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ABSTRACT 
 
The Department of Nuclear Engineering at Texas A&M University currently 
supports emergency response exercises at Disaster City, a mock community used for 
emergency response training that features full-scale, collapsible structures designed to 
simulate various levels of disaster and wreckage. Several times a year, sealed radioactive 
sources are used at Disaster City to create radiation fields in which emergency 
responders can become more familiar with dose rates and how to use their radiation 
detection equipment. This research seeks to enhance emergency response exercises by 
using unsealed radioactive sources to simulate a more realistic response environment 
following an incident involving the dispersion of radioactive material.  
Limited exercises are performed worldwide using unsealed radioactive sources, 
and most of that information is not published. This research compiles that information 
and presents the process for selection of a short-lived radionuclide for use at Disaster 
City. Historically-used radionuclides were considered, as well as other short-lived 
radionuclides commonly utilized or capable of being produced at Texas A&M. A 
preliminary dose assessment for the exercise was performed based on conservative 
calculation methods used in assessments for unsealed contamination exercises performed 
at other sites. The assessment was broken into four parts: activation, distribution, 
exercise participation, and post-exercise monitoring. The computer code MicroShield 
was used to determine external exposure from the source during and after distribution. 
Internal exposure via inhalation and ingestion was estimated by assuming fractional 
 iii 
 
intakes of activity and converting to dose using allowable limits on intake and dose 
conversion factors.  
The selection process identified seven radionuclides that could be used in an 
unsealed contamination exercise at Disaster City. Pharmaceuticals 99mTc and 18F are 
suitable and available for purchase from nearby vendors. In addition, the Texas A&M 
Nuclear Science Center TRIGA reactor could be used to produce 24Na, 56Mn, 64Cu, 82Br, 
and 140La via thermal neutron activation. It was determined from the dose assessment 
that a radionuclide-dependent range of 1-40 mCi can be used to achieve detectable dose 
rates during the exercise without exceeding assumed administrative dose limits. Tc-99m 
results in the lowest dose and is recommended from a radiological safety standpoint. 
However, the choice of which radionuclide and what activity to use for an exercise 
should be made based on budget and the logistics of the actual exercise. 
 
 
 iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to thank my advisor and committee chair, Dr. Marianno, and my 
committee members, Dr. Poston and Dr. Murphy, for their guidance and support 
throughout the course of this research. 
Many thanks also to the friends I have made while studying at Texas A&M. I am 
incredibly grateful for my education and will always treasure the friendships I have 
made with classmates and colleagues, particularly in the Department of Nuclear 
Engineering. 
Finally, thanks to my mother and father for their endless encouragement and to 
my husband, Tyler, for his patience and love over the years. 
 v 
 
NOMENCLATURE 
 
10 CFR 20 Title 10 Part 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
ALARA as low as reasonably achievable 
ALI allowable limit on intake 
CDE committed dose equivalent 
CEDE committed effective dose equivalent 
CVM College of Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical Sciences 
DCF dose conversion factor 
DDE deep-dose equivalent 
DRDC Defence Research and Development Canada 
EHSD Environmental Health and Safety Department 
HMIS Hazardous Materials Identification System  
INL Idaho National Laboratory 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NCRP National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements  
NNSS Nevada National Security Site 
NSC Nuclear Science Center 
PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 
PPE personal protective equipment 
PRex Particle Release Experiment 
SDE shallow-dose equivalent 
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SRNL Savannah River National Laboratory  
TEDE total effective dose equivalent  
TODE total organ dose equivalent  
TRACER Testing Radiation and Contamination in Emergency Response  
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
I.A. Motivation 
It is important for emergency responders to be able to respond to incidents 
involving dispersed radioactive material, including nuclear power plant accidents, 
transportation accidents, and terrorist attacks using radiological or nuclear devices. The 
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) defines emergency 
responders as “individuals who in the early stages of an incident are responsible for the 
protection and preservation of life, property, evidence and the environment” (NCRP 
2005).  Many of these responders include local officials, law enforcement, and other 
support personnel who do not regularly interact with radiation and radioactive material. 
Specialized programs and facilities have been created for training emergency responders 
on how to respond in radiological environments. NCRP Commentary No. 19 states that 
the overall objectives for training emergency responders in a nuclear or radiological 
scenario include (1) enhancing their ability to take appropriate measures to protect 
themselves and the public, and (2) increasing their confidence about effectively 
managing an emergency involving radiation or radioactive materials (NCRP 2005).  
Faculty and students in the Department of Nuclear Engineering at Texas A&M 
University currently support exercises at Disaster City, a mock community used for 
emergency response training that features full-scale, collapsible structures designed to 
simulate various levels of disaster and wreckage (TEEX Disaster City 2005). Several 
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times a year, sealed radioactive sources are used at Disaster City to create radiation 
fields in which emergency responders can become more familiar with dose rates and 
how to use their radiation detection equipment. This research seeks to enhance 
emergency response exercises by using unsealed radioactive sources, which simulate a 
more realistic response environment following an incident involving the dispersion of 
radioactive material. 
 
I.B. Literature Review 
Limited field exercises are performed worldwide using unsealed radioactive 
sources (Rothbacher et al. 2015), and most of that information is not published. A 
literature review yielded information on a variety of exercise types, including dispersion 
tests, emergency response field exercises, and laboratory-scale exercises. The following 
sections summarize the available information. 
 
I.B.1. Dispersion Tests  
In 2012, Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) conducted field 
trials where explosives were used to disperse 1 Ci of 140La to simulate a radiological 
dispersal device (Green et al. 2016). The goal of the trials was to obtain measurements 
that could be used to characterize plumes and deposition patterns. La-140 was selected 
because of its short 40-h half-life, easily detected gamma and beta emissions, stable 
daughter (140Ce), and availability via neutron activation of 139La at a nearby research 
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reactor. The chemical form was powdered lanthanum oxide (La2O3) which when 
explosively dispersed would create the desired range of particle sizes. 
Following DRDC’s example, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) 
performed the Particle Release Experiment (PRex) at the Nevada National Security Site 
(NNSS) in 2013 (Keillor et al. 2016). In this experiment, 1 Ci of 140La in La2O3 form 
was released to simulate small-scale venting from an underground nuclear test. The 
purpose of the test was to obtain ground contamination measurements using different 
sampling and survey techniques. PNNL also considered using 198Au-coated 
aluminosilicate microspheres for PRex, but was unable to successfully produce them in 
time for the exercise. Au-198 was considered because of its 2.69-d half-life and ability to 
be produced via neutron activation. 
Detonation field tests similar to those performed by DRDC and PNNL have 
occurred in the Czech Republic using 99mTc in a 0.9% sodium chloride solution (Prouza 
et al. 2010; Rulik et al. 2013). Tc-99m was selected for its radioactive characteristics. It 
is a readily available gamma-ray emitter that is commonly used in diagnostic nuclear 
medicine due to its short 6-h half-life. Ten tests were conducted from 2007 to 2010 for 
the purposes of informing dispersion models. The activities in these tests ranged from 
0.75 to 2.02 MBq. The technetium was diluted in 1.5 L of potassium permanganate 
aqueous solution in eight of the tests. Twenty dispersion tests using 6 to 8 Ci of 99mTc 
were also conducted in Israel from 2010 to 2014 (Sharon et al. 2014).   
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I.B.2. Field Exercises  
NNSS also used 99mTc for its Testing Radiation and Contamination in 
Emergency Response (TRACER) program (Gwin 2012). In the TRACER exercises, the 
technetium was dissolved in water and sprayed on target areas at the T-1 site to create a 
realistic response environment for the exercise participants. The pre-exercise dose 
assessment performed by NNSS has been acquired, but was not available publically. 
Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) conducted field exercises using  
10 mCi of 18F, a common radiopharmaceutical used in positron emission tomography in 
fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG) form (Brown et al. 2010). F-18 decays to stable 18O via 
positron emission and has a 110-min half-life. The short half-life and stable daughter 
were characteristics desired by SRNL. Similar to the NNSS exercises using technetium, 
SRNL diluted the 18F in water for distribution. SRNL considered using 99mTc but 
decided against it because it decays to 99Tc, which has a long half-life and could create a 
soil-to-groundwater contamination issue (Randy Brown, SRNL, personal 
communication, October 2015). It is speculated that this was less of an issue for NNSS 
because the T-1 site is already contaminated due to its history as a nuclear weapon test 
site. Information about the SRNL exercise was not publically available. 
Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has conducted radiological response training 
exercises using KBr, which was irradiated in the INL Neutron Radiography TRIGA 
reactor (INL 2010). The available environmental assessment document for the exercise 
does not discuss why KBr was selected for the exercise other than that the activated KBr 
is short-lived. The environmental assessment was performed under the assumption that a 
 5 
 
variety of distribution methods would potentially be used, including spreading the 
radionuclide as a powder or spraying it as a water solution, as well as dispersing it using 
compressed air and explosives. Details about the INL exercise and dose assessment were 
not publically available. 
Aqueous 140La was used to contaminate a metal drum and a square patch of 
grassy ground in a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) exercise in 2003 (Haslip 
et al. 2004). The goal of the exercise was to validate NATO protocols for radiological 
sampling and surveying. The details of this exercise have not been located. 
 
I.B.3. Laboratory Exercises  
Earlier research regarding mobile radiological laboratory exercises using spiked 
samples was also found in the review (Martincic 2000; Inn et al. 2006; Lortie et al. 
2012). In these exercises, environmental samples were spiked with common long-lived 
fission products (e.g., 60Co, 90Sr, 137Cs, 241Am). A publication about a nuclear power 
plant exercise at Browns Ferry in 1985 also described the use of spiked environmental 
samples, but using 131I and objects contaminated with 99mTc (McNees 1986). Exercises 
performed by DRDC in 2005 and 2006 similarly used 99mTc in a crime scene simulation 
(Larsson et al. 2006). Seibersdorf Laboratories in Austria provides a decontamination 
training course that uses unsealed radioactive sources (Stolar 2012). In this course, 
participants decontaminate dummies, cars, and other materials.  
The difference between these laboratory exercises and the previously described 
dispersion tests and emergency response field exercises is that the radioactivity is 
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contained to the samples or objects in the case of the mobile laboratory and nuclear 
power plant exercises. Loose surface contamination is desired for the Disaster City 
exercise. 
 
I.B.4. Other Exercises  
The literature review yielded a few more unique results. For example, unsealed 
contamination has been simulated using fluorescent powder (Heaton 1992). The powder 
mimics radioactivity in that it is often not visible but detectable using ultraviolet light. 
The issue with this approach is that this non-radioactive simulant will not properly 
stimulate an ionizing radiation detector, and a primary objective of the Disaster City 
exercise is for the participants to become familiar with using their detection equipment 
in radiological emergencies. 
Another unique training course provided by Hotzone-Solutions was found in the 
review. The Hotzone-Solutions “nuclear emergency training” course is administered in 
the Chernobyl exclusion zone (Rothbacher et al. 2015). This course uses the 
radioactivity remaining from the 1986 Chernobyl accident as a source for training on 
using detection equipment in a contaminated environment.  
 
I.C. Objectives 
The overall objective of this research is to investigate the use of short-lived 
radionuclides that could be used for unsealed contamination emergency response 
exercises at Disaster City. The research is divided into two phases. The first phase is the 
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determination of radionuclides that are short-lived, can be easily produced at or acquired 
by Texas A&M, and that generate radiation fields that can be detected by the instruments 
carried by responders. The second phase is a dose assessment to ensure that doses 
received by exercise controllers and participants are kept as low as reasonably 
achievable (ALARA). The results of this assessment will be used to determine which 
radionuclides and activities are appropriate for the Disaster City exercise. 
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CHAPTER II  
METHODOLOGY 
 
II.A. Radionuclide Selection 
In an effort to limit the scope of this research, the distribution method was 
limited to dissolving the radioactive compound in water and spraying it onto surfaces 
within the Disaster City complex. This approach is intended to be a controlled way of 
distributing the unsealed radioactivity. 
Several criteria were used to determine whether or not each radionuclide is 
suitable for an exercise at Disaster City. The selected radionuclide should (i) decay to a 
stable nuclide, (ii) possess a half-life appropriate for the duration of the exercise, (iii) 
emit detectable gamma-ray radiation, (iv) be soluble in water, (v) not cause harm to 
humans and the environment due to its physical or radioactive properties, (vi) be readily 
available, and (vii) be cost effective. It is best to use short-lived radionuclides for 
exercises using unsealed radioactivity in order to reduce or even eliminate the need for 
decontamination. It is also important to use a radionuclide that has a short half-life so 
that the contaminated area at Disaster City is not inaccessible for an extended period of 
time. 
Radionuclides that have been used in past unsealed contamination exercises were 
evaluated against the selection criteria. Short-lived radionuclides that are commonly 
utilized or capable of being produced at Texas A&M were also evaluated. The College 
of Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical Sciences (CVM) at Texas A&M uses two 
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radiopharmaceuticals for diagnostic procedures – 18F and 99mTc. Radiopharmaceuticals 
possess several properties that make them attractive for use in the Disaster City exercise. 
These radionuclides are not harmful to humans (in properly administered doses) and 
have short effective half-lives such that they do not remain in the body very long. 
The Texas A&M Nuclear Science Center (NSC) operates a 1 MW TRIGA 
research reactor, located a five-minute drive from Disaster City. The TRIGA reactor can 
potentially be used to produce short-lived radionuclides for use at Disaster City via 
thermal neutron activation. If this production method is used, the radionuclide must be in 
a chemical form such that other elements in the compound are either not activated or if 
activated, are very short-lived relative to the desired target. Additionally, it is important 
for the compound to be as chemically pure as possible so that no long-lived impurities 
are produced as a result of the activation. It is possible that multiple short-lived 
radionuclides could be activated in a water-soluble compound, but this assessment is 
limited to compounds in which a single element is radioactive and the rest of the 
compound is stable. 
 
II.B. Dose Assessment 
The Disaster City exercise will take place in the daytime with little-to-no wind 
and no precipitation. The dose assessment begins at the point that the radioactive source 
is received at Disaster City. Once on-site, the source will be placed into a container full 
of water, dissolved, and sprayed onto the desired surface. The exercise participants will 
not be permitted into the contaminated area until the source has been allowed to settle 
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onto the surface. This limits exposure via inhalation to resuspension of the surface 
contamination. Access to the area surrounding the contaminated area will be limited to 
exercise controllers and participants.  
The radionuclides that met the selection criteria were included in the dose 
assessment to determine which radionuclides result in a justifiable dose for the needed 
dose rates for detection. The dose assessment for the NNSS exercise (Gwin 2012) was 
used as the basis for the Disaster City dose assessment. The calculations were performed 
under the conservative assumption that no personal protective equipment (PPE) or 
shielding will be used.  
 
II.B.1. External Exposure 
The radionuclide was treated as a point source until dissolved in water on-site at 
Disaster City. The method for determining the dose rate, Ẋ, in rem h-1 from a point 
source is defined in Eq. 1  
 
 Ẋ =
ΓA
r2
 
(1) 
where Γ is the specific gamma-ray constant for the radionuclide (R m2 h-1 Ci-1), A is the 
source activity (Ci), and r is the radial distance from the source (m). The dose rates at  
1 cm and 30 cm were calculated to determine extremity and whole body exposures, 
respectively. The quality factor for gamma radiation is 1, so it was assumed that 1 R is 
equal to 1 rem. The source was assumed to be handled for a maximum of one minute 
while emptied into the sprayer. 
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The one-gallon sprayer that will be used to distribute the radioactive solution was 
assumed to be a cylinder. Therefore, external exposure calculations for the spraying 
portion of the exercise used a cylindrical volume for the source geometry. The height of 
the sprayer was assumed to be 20.32 cm (8.0 in) and 7.62 cm (3.0 in). The dose rates at  
1 cm and 30 cm above the cylinder were calculated. The duration of the distribution was 
assumed to take a maximum of 30 min. 
The cylindrical source was modeled using MicroShield, which was used in the 
NNSS assessment. MicroShield is a program that is used to design radiological shields 
and containers and assess radiation exposure to people and materials (MicroShield 
2015). The point kernel method is used to calculate radiation exposure for the majority 
of the 16 source geometries available in MicroShield (infinite plane and infinite slab 
excluded). The point kernel method breaks down a distributed source into small surface 
or volume elements and treats each element as a point source. The source strength 
divided by 4πr2 is attenuated using the appropriate attenuation coefficients and buildup 
factors for each point. The contribution from each point at the location of interest is then 
summed to obtain a point kernel solution. 
A study by NNSS determined that a one-gallon sprayer can cover a 308.8 m2 area 
(Gwin 2012). This was the area assumed to be contaminated in the Disaster City 
assessment. For comparison, the area of Rubble Pile 1 at Disaster City is estimated to be 
1083 m2, so approximately 29% of the pile would be contaminated if used for this 
exercise. The solution was treated as a surface source once distributed. This surface 
source was also modeled in MicroShield as an infinite plane source with uniformly 
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distributed activity. Integral solutions are used in MicroShield for the infinite plane 
geometry instead of the point kernel method. Because of this, buildup is calculated using 
the Taylor approximation for the infinite geometries. The dose rates at 1 cm, 30 cm, and 
100 cm above the contaminated surface were calculated. The exercise participants were 
assumed to operate in the contaminated area for three hours.  
 
II.B.2. Internal Exposure 
Internal exposure via inhalation and ingestion at all stages of the exercise was 
estimated by assuming fractional intakes of activity and converting to dose. The whole 
body committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE), HE, in rem was estimated using  
Eq. 2 
 
 HE =
5 ∗ I
ALI
 
(2) 
 
where I is the intake in µCi, ALI is the stochastic allowable limit on intake in µCi, as 
provided in Title 10 Part 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 20), “Standards 
for Protection Against Radiation,” (U.S. NRC 1992) and 5 is the CEDE in rem from 
annual intake of 1 ALI.  
The committed dose equivalent (CDE), HT, in rem to the maximum exposed 
organ was estimated using Eq. 3   
  HT = I ∗ DCFT ∗ 3.7x10
6 (3) 
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where I is the intake in µCi, DCFT is the organ-specific dose conversion factor for the 
maximum exposed organ in Sv Bq-1 as provided in Environmental Protection Agency 
Federal Guidance Report No. 11 (Eckerman et al. 1988), and 3.7x106 is the conversion 
factor to convert from Sv Bq-1 to rem µCi-1. Following the NNSS approach, the worker 
that distributes the radionuclide was assumed to inhale and ingest 1% of the activity in 
the sprayer. A 1 µCi intake was assumed for the exercise participants.  
The contaminated area was assumed to be posted until the surface contamination 
levels decay below 1000 dpm/100 cm2 (4.51x10-6 µCi cm-2), as recommended for beta-
gamma emitters in NUREG-1556 Volume 7 Appendix Q (Fuller et al. 1999). The length 
of time needed to reach this contamination level was determined using the exponential 
decay equation (Eq. (4)) 
  A = A0e
−λt (4) 
where A is the desired contamination limit, 1000 dpm/100 cm2,  A0 is the initial surface 
contamination level (µCi cm-2), λ is the decay constant for the radionuclide (h-1) and t is 
the time in hours to reach A. After the area is released, it will be monitored as long as 
agreed by Disaster City personnel and the Texas A&M Environmental Health and Safety 
Department (EHSD). 
 
II.B.3. Accidents  
Accident scenarios were also analyzed. The CEDE and CDE resulting from the 
negligent ingestion and inhalation of the entire source was estimated using Eq. 2 and  
14 
Eq. 3. The CEDE from a contaminated wound was estimated using Eq. 2, where the 
intake is treated as an ingestion of 100 cm2 of the surface contamination level.  
The external dose equivalent received by a member of the public that entered the 
contaminated area was estimated by multiplying the external dose rates obtained using 
MicroShield by a conservatively-assumed duration of 12 h. The CEDE for a member of 
the public cannot be estimated using Eq. 2 because the ALI corresponds to the 5 rem 
occupational limit for radiation workers. Instead, the CEDE for the public, HE,pub, is 
estimated using Eq. 5 
HE,pub = I ∗ DCFE ∗ 3.7x10
6 (5) 
where I is the intake in µCi and DCFE is the effective dose conversion factor in Sv Bq
-1 
as provided in Environmental Protection Agency Federal Guidance Report No. 11 
(Eckerman et al. 1988). An intake of 1 µCi was assumed, following the assumptions 
used for the exercise participants. 
Skin or PPE contamination is possible during the spraying process and during the 
exercise. Following the NNSS approach, the computer code VARSKIN was used to 
evaluate skin exposure from a 1 µCi drop of the radioactive solution. VARSKIN can be 
used to calculate the absorbed dose from beta-particle irradiation via numerical 
integration of the Berger point kernel. It can also be used to calculate the absorbed dose 
for gamma radiation using point kernel integration (Hamby et al. 2011). 
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The assumption to assign a single drop of solution an activity of 1 µCi was based 
on the activity concentration of the solution in the spraying container. An activity of  
50 mCi dissolved in one gallon of water yields an activity concentration of  
13.2 µCi mL-1. A drop was assumed to have a volume of 0.05 mL. Therefore, the 
activity of a single drop would be 0.66 µCi. This was rounded up to 1 µCi for 
simplification and conservativism. 
The drop was assumed to cover an area of 10 cm2 and remain on the area for a 
maximum of 15 min. The contamination was modeled in VARKSIN as a disk geometry 
with a skin-averaging area of 10 cm2. 10 CFR 20 states that the shallow-dose equivalent 
(SDE) to the skin must be averaged over the 10 cm2 of skin that receives the highest 
exposure. The SDE to the skin at a tissue depth of 0.007 cm (7 mg cm-2) and deep-dose 
equivalent (DDE) at a depth of 1 cm (1000 mg cm-2) were evaluated for a 1 µCi drop of 
each radionuclide on bare skin, skin covered by a plastic lab coat, and skin covered by 
two surgeon gloves. The lab coat was assumed to be 0.2 mm thick and have a density of 
0.36 g cm-3. A single surgeon glove was assumed to be 0.05 mm thick and have a 
density of 0.9 g cm-3. These values were selected based on the suggested values provided 
in the VARSKIN manual (Hamby et al. 2011). 
 A spill scenario in which 1 mCi of the radioactive solution was dropped onto a 
100 cm2 area was also analyzed. This area is less than 0.01% of the total contaminated 
area assumed, 308.8 m2. The 1 mCi activity was selected following the NNSS 
assessment approach. Equation 4 was used to determine the time needed for the spilled 
material to decay below the 1000 dpm/100 cm2 surface contamination limit. 
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II.B.4. Administrative Dose Limits 
The federal occupational dose limits are defined in 10 CFR 20.1201. The annual 
total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) limit for occupational workers is 5 rem. The 
TEDE is defined as the sum of the DDE due to whole body external exposure and the 
CEDE. The annual total organ dose equivalent (TODE) limit for occupational workers is 
50 rem. The TODE is defined as the sum of the DDE and the CDE to the maximum-
exposed individual organ or tissue.  
The doses estimated for the worker that dissolves and distributes the source were 
compared with the administrative dose limits set by EHSD. The EHSD administrative 
dose limits are 10% of the occupational annual limits, or 500 mrem TEDE and 5 rem 
TODE. The exercise participants could potentially also be held to occupational 
administrative limits. However in an effort to be even more conservative, the doses 
estimated for the exercise participants were compared with 10% of the EHSD 
administrative dose limits, or 50 mrem TEDE and 500 mrem TODE.  
Skin exposure from a drop of the radioactive solution on the skin was compared 
to the EHSD administrative dose limit for the SDE, which is 10% of the 50 rem 
occupational annual limit, or 5 rem. The estimated dose to a member of the public that 
enters the contaminated area was compared with the federal annual dose limit for 
individual members of the public, which is 100 mrem TEDE.   
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CHAPTER III  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
III.A. Radionuclide Comparison 
 The seven radionuclides identified for potential use at Disaster City are located in 
Table 1. Their radiological properties are included in Appendix A. All of the 
historically-used radionuclides (140La, 99mTc, and 18F) were deemed suitable for the 
Disaster City exercise. Tc-99m is available as sodium pertechnetate (NaTcO4) from a 
local vendor. F-18 is available as FDG from a vendor in Houston. Both chemical forms 
are soluble in water. Both radionuclides have short half-lives and emit low-energy 
gamma-rays. Tc-99m does not meet the requirement of decaying to a stable nuclide, but 
the decay product, 99Tc, is very long-lived and was kept in the assessment. 
Several radionuclides were identified for potential production using the NSC 
TRIGA reactor. Na-23 and 55Mn are both 100% naturally monoisotopic and can be 
activated to short-lived 24Na and 56Mn, respectively. Both beta-decay to stable nuclides 
and emit detectable gamma-rays. Short irradiation times most likely do not allow for 
successive neutron captures but if they occurred, they would produce heavier sodium 
and manganese isotopes that have very short half-lives (several seconds to several 
minutes) and primarily beta-decay to stable nuclides. La-140 can also be produced via 
neutron activation. Lanthanum exists naturally as nearly 100% 139La. The small percent 
that is not 139La is 138La, which if irradiated with neutrons would become the desired 
139La.  
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Table 1. Comparison of the radionuclides deemed suitable for use in an unsealed 
contamination exercise at Disaster City. The asterisk indicates a radionuclide that is not 
100% naturally abundant. 
Criteria Tc-99m F-18 La-140 Na-24 Mn-56 Cu-64* Br-82* 
Decay 
mode 
IT, β- EC+β+ β- β- β- EC+β+,  
β- 
β- 
Stable 
daughter 
Tc-99 
(not 
stable) 
O-18 Ce-140 Mg-24 Fe-56 Ni-64  
and  
Zn-64 
Kr-82 
T
1/2
 (h) 6.0 1.8 40 15 2.6 13 35 
Compound 
soluble in 
water with  
no safety 
hazards 
NaTcO
4
 FDG La
2
(SO
4
)
3
 NaHCO
3
 
NaC
2
H
3
O
2 
     
-3H
2
O 
MnSO
4
 
   -H
2
O 
HMIS 
health 
rating  
≥ 2 
MgBr
2
 
Solubility 
(g/100 g 
H
2
O) 
Soluble Soluble 2.33 
(20°C) 
10.3 
(25°C) 
50.4 
(25°C) 
63.7 
(25°C) 
-- 102 
(25°C) 
 
Other naturally-stable elements that become short-lived radionuclides when 
activated include 63Cu, which becomes 64Cu (12.7-h half-life) and 81Br, which becomes 
82Br (35.3-h half-life). The issue with these nuclides is that they are not 100% naturally 
abundant. The natural abundances of 63Cu and 81Br are 69.15% and 49.31%, 
respectively. The other natural isotope of copper is 65Cu (30.85% natural abundance), 
which can be activated to become 66Cu. Cu-66 has a short 5.10-min half-life but has a 
neutron capture cross-section of 140 b and can be activated to become 67Cu (2.58-d half-
life). The other natural isotope of bromine is 79Br (50.69% natural abundance) which can 
be activated to become 80Br. Br-80 has a 17.7-min half-life and a metastable state with a 
4.42-h half-life. Both are shorter lived than the desired 82Br, and 80Br beta-decays to 
stable 80Kr (92% branching ratio) or decays by electron capture to stable 80Se. In 
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addition, neutron capture by 82Br produces 83Br, which has a 2.40-h half-life. The more 
complicated neutron activation and resulting decay chains for producing 64Cu and 82Br 
makes them less desirable for use in the Disaster City exercise.  
Suitable water-soluble compounds were identified for the radionuclides that 
could be produced via neutron activation. To avoid hazards due to chemical properties, 
only compounds with the following Hazardous Materials Identification System (HMIS) 
numeric hazard ratings were considered: health – 1 or 0, flammability – 0, physical 
hazard – 0, and personal protection – 0. The identified compounds are listed in Table 1. 
These compounds contain elements that will not be activated (Texas A&M Nuclear 
Science Center, personal correspondence, February 2016), including hydrogen, carbon, 
oxygen, sulfur, and magnesium. Appendix B contains the thermal neutron capture cross 
sections for these elements and the elements intended for activation. All water-soluble 
compounds of copper that met the criteria for neutron activation had HMIS health hazard 
ratings of two or greater. Copper was included in the dose assessment in case the 
chemical hazard restrictions for the actual exercise are less stringent.  
 
III.B. Dose Calculations 
A dose assessment tool was developed that allows the user to select from a 
library of radionuclides to perform dose estimates for an exercise at Disaster City. The 
library of radionuclide properties (e.g., half-life, radiation emissions and energies) is 
automatically input. The gamma-ray constants, ALIs, and DCFs are located in Appendix 
C. Other user inputs include exercise duration, activity, and the size of the contaminated 
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area. The tool performs the previously detailed calculations to determine the estimated 
doses associated with each part of the exercise, including dose to the worker that 
dissolves and sprays the source and dose to the exercise participants.  
 The doses resulting from several activities ranging from 1 mCi to 100 mCi were 
examined for each of the seven identified radionuclides. These doses were compared to 
the respective administrative dose limit set for each individual. The worker TEDE is the 
most restrictive dose of the entire exercise. Fig. 1 displays the worker TEDE as a 
function of activity up to 100 mCi. Fig. 2 displays the same information as Fig. 1 but 
with an abscissa limited to 20 mCi because the 500 mrem TEDE administrative dose 
limit was exceeded for several of the radionuclides above 20 mCi. Fig. 2 shows that 
activities below 20 mCi are needed for 140La, 82Br, and 24Na. Greater activities can be 
used for 56Mn, 64Cu, 18F, and 99mTc. At 100 mCi, the estimated dose is still well below 
the administrative dose limit for 99mTc and 18F.  
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Fig. 1. Worker TEDE as a function of activity up to 100 mCi. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Worker TEDE as a function of activity up to 20 mCi. 
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Fig. 3 displays the worker TODE as a function of activity. The 5 rem TODE 
administrative dose limit for the worker is exceeded for 140La, 82Br, and 24Na at 80 mCi. 
At 40 mCi, the estimated TODEs are below the administrative dose limit for all 
radionuclides. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Worker TODE as a function of activity. 
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contributes more to dose than inhalation because the effective DCF is larger for 
ingestion than inhalation. This is the case for all of the studied radionuclides. For the 
worker CDE, inhalation contributes more to dose than ingestion for most of the 
radionuclides because the limiting organ DCF for inhalation is larger than ingestion, 
except for 18F and 99mTc. Appendix C includes the limiting organs for ingestion and 
inhalation for each radionuclide. 
 
Fig. 4. The external and internal contributions to the worker TEDE are shown for  
10, 20, and 40 mCi of each radionuclide. 
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Fig. 5. The external and internal contributions to the worker TODE are shown for  
10, 20, and 40 mCi of each radionuclide. 
 
Fig. 6 displays the exercise participant TEDE as a function of activity. The 
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than the TEDE for the worker (depending on the activity). The 50 mrem TEDE 
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Fig. 6. Exercise participant TEDE as a function of activity. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Exercise participant TODE as a function of activity. 
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Unlike the worker TEDE and TODEs, the radionuclide that results in the greatest 
dose to the exercise participant changes depending on activity. Below 20 mCi, 140La 
results in the greatest dose. As activity increases, 24Na and 82Br overtake 140La and 
contribute more to total dose. This is because internal exposure remains the same no 
matter what amount of activity is used due to the flat 1 µCi intake assumption for the 
exercise participants. Therefore, external exposure contributes more to total dose as 
activity increases. This is seen in Fig. 8 for the TEDE and Fig. 9 for the TODE.  
 
 
Fig. 8. The external and internal contributions to the exercise participant TEDE are 
shown for 10, 20, and 40 mCi of each radionuclide. 
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Fig. 9. The external and internal contributions to the exercise participant TODE are 
shown for 10, 20, and 40 mCi of each radionuclide. 
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 Fig. 10. Exercise participant TEDE as a function of activities less than 1 mCi. 
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III.C. Activity Determination 
The overall analysis of TEDE and TODE for the worker and exercise participant 
yields that the worker TEDE restricts activity the most. Table 2 displays the maximum 
activities that should be used for each radionuclide and the resulting dose rate 100 cm 
from the contaminated surface during the exercise. Greater activities could be used for 
18F and 99mTc. An activity of 20 mCi was selected for these radionuclides as this is a 
typical activity used pharmaceutically (Brown et al. 2010). The dose rate during the 3-h 
exercise exceeds 1 mrem h-1 for several of the nuclides in Table 2. Activity could be 
decreased further for these radionuclides while maintaining a detectable dose rate 
compared to the background dose rate at Disaster City, which is about 10 µR h-1 based 
on past exercises. 
Table 2. The maximum activity for the exercise was determined for the identified 
radionuclides. The assumed contamination area was 308.8 m2. The asterisk indicates that 
a greater activity could be used without exceeding administrative dose limits. 
Radionuclide 
Maximum activity  
(mCi) 
Maximum dose rate at  
100 cm during exercise  
(mrem h-1) 
F-18 20* 1.68 
Na-24 10 2.24 
Mn-56 20 2.09 
Cu-64 40 0.71 
Br-82 10 1.91 
Tc-99m 20* 0.33 
La-140 1 0.14 
 
La-140, 24Na, and 82Br require more limiting activities because these 
radionuclides also emit gamma-rays that are higher in energy relative to the other 
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radionuclides. La-140 causes more significant dose to the worker than 24Na and 82Br 
because of internal exposure. The absorption fraction, 𝑓1, for 
140La is very low (0.001) 
relative to the other radionuclides (0.1-1). This value is the fraction of a stable element 
that reaches the body fluid after ingestion (ICRP 1979). Because 𝑓1 is so low for 
140La, 
ingested lanthanum spends more time in the body and causes more dose. The inhalation 
DCFs for 140La are also greater than for the other radionuclides. Tc-99m results in the 
lowest doses among all of the radionuclides due to its low-energy gamma-ray and small 
DCFs relative to the other studied radionuclides. 
Using the activities listed in Table 2, the maximum duration of an exercise was 
determined for each radionuclide, along with the time it would take for the source to 
decay to a contamination level of 1000 dpm/100 cm2. The minimum detectable dose rate 
for an exercise was assumed to be twice background at Disaster City, or 20 uR h-1. This 
time-related information is captured in Table 3. 
Table 3. The maximum exercise duration and time required to decay below  
1000 dpm/100 cm2 are listed for the assumed activities. 
Radionuclide 
Maximum 
Activity  
(mCi) 
Maximum exercise  
duration 
Time required before 
release of contaminated 
area 
(h) (d) (h) (d) 
F-18 20* 11.7 0.49 19.2 0.80 
Na-24 10 102 4.25 142 5.93 
Mn-56 20 17.3 0.72 27.1 1.13 
Cu-64 40 65.4 2.73 146 6.08 
Br-82 10 232 9.67 335 14.0 
Tc-99m 20* 24.3 1.01 63.0 2.63 
La-140 1 113 4.71 248 10.4 
 
 31 
 
The varied half-life among the radionuclides provides a way to modify the 
exercise. For example, multiple applications of a very short-lived radionuclide such as 
18F could occur in one day, or a single application of a longer-lived radionuclide could 
be detectable for several days. For a single application of the activities listed in Table 2, 
the contaminated area would be unusable at a minimum of less than a day (18F) and a 
maximum of two weeks (82Br). 
 Although 99mTc has a short effective half-life, it decays to stable 99Tc (211,100-y 
half-life) which would be present in the environment for potentially thousands of years.  
The resulting 99Tc surface activity from a single application of 99mTc would not 
constitute a radiological hazard or even be detectable and would not build up to the  
1000 dpm/100 cm2 limit even with hundreds of applications (Gwin 2012). 
 
III.D. Accident Scenario Doses 
Accident scenarios were examined for the activity levels restricted for worker 
exposure, as displayed in Table 2. The estimated doses for the contaminated wound and 
public exposure scenarios are listed in Table 4. For a contaminated wound, the 
administrative dose limits are not exceeded for any of the studied activities and 
radionuclides. The dose to a member of the public that enters the contaminated area was 
compared to the 100 mrem annual public dose limit. This dose limit is not exceeded at 
the activity levels restricted for worker exposure. Minimal dose to a member of the 
public assumed to be in the contaminated area implies that negligible dose should be 
received to a member of the public at the perimeter of the Disaster City site.  
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Table 4. Estimated doses for a contaminated wound and for a member of the public  
entering the contaminated area. 
Radionuclide 
Maximum 
Activity  
(mCi) 
Contaminated 
Wound CEDE 
(mrem) 
Member of Public 
TEDE  
(mrem) 
TODE  
(mrem) 
F-18 20* 0.07 20.3 21.6 
Na-24 10 0.41 29.5 33.3 
Mn-56 20 0.65 26.4 27.0 
Cu-64 40 0.65 9.24 9.93 
Br-82 10 0.54 26.2 30.8 
Tc-99m 20* 0.04 4.10 4.44 
La-140 1 0.27 13.6 12.8 
 
The accident scenario that results in the greatest dose is ingestion or inhalation of 
the entire source. Administrative dose limits are exceeded for all of the studied activities 
in this scenario. Table 5 displays the CEDE and CDE resulting from intakes of the 
activities restricted for worker exposure, as defined in Table 2. 
Table 5. Estimated doses for worker ingestion or inhalation of the entire source. 
Radionuclide 
Maximum 
Activity  
(mCi) 
Ingestion 
CEDE 
(rem) 
Ingestion 
CDE 
(rem) 
Inhalation 
CEDE 
(rem) 
Inhalation 
CDE 
(rem) 
F-18 20* 2.00 21.2 1.43 9.55 
Na-24 10 12.5 17.3 10.0 46.3 
Mn-56 20 20.0 6.31 5.00 32.6 
Cu-64 40 20.0 7.07 10.0 49.6 
Br-82 10 16.7 16.6 12.5 62.2 
Tc-99m 20* 1.25 6.26 0.50 2.27 
La-140 1 8.33 4.96 5.00 6.14 
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The computer code VARSKIN was used to determine the SDE and DDE 
resulting from a 1 µCi drop of solution on 10 cm2 of skin with a 15-min exposure time. 
This exposure is compared to an annual SDE administrative limit of 5 rem. Fig. 11 
displays the SDE results and Fig. 12 displays the DDE results. For a 1 µCi drop on the 
skin, the administrative SDE limit is not exceeded. The DDE is less than 2 mrad and 
would contribute marginally to the TODE. For the SDE, beta exposure contributes most 
to dose. Conversely, the DDE is driven by primarily gamma-ray exposure. This is as 
expected. Adding a lab coat or two surgeon gloves reduces the SDE by a factor of 1.16 
to 1.54 depending on the radionuclide. The additional PPE has little effect on the DDE. 
 
 
Fig. 11. The SDE is shown for a 1 µCi drop of solution on bare skin, and skin covered 
by a plastic lab coat or two surgeon gloves. 
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Fig. 12. The DDE is shown for a 1 µCi drop of solution on bare skin, and skin covered 
by a plastic lab coat or two surgeon gloves. 
 
The dose resulting from skin exposure increases linearly with increasing activity. 
As much as about 30 µCi of 18F, 24Na, 56Mn, and 140La could be dropped onto a 10 cm2 
area of bare skin without exceeding the 5 rem administrative limit. Cu-64 emits fairly 
low-energy beta particles at low yields, so as much as about 60 µCi could be tolerated on 
bare skin without exceeding the administrative SDE limit. The SDE from a 1 µCi drop 
of 99mTc is very small because 99mTc doesn’t emit beta particles. Tc-99m contributes less 
than 50 µrad to DDE. This is because the 140 keV gamma ray emitted by 99mTc is very 
low energy relative to the other studied radionuclides. The skin can tolerate a drop of 
nearly 10 mCi of 99mTc without exceeding the administrative SDE limit. 
 35 
 
 Table 6 displays the time needed for a 1 mCi spill of the radioactive solution over 
a small area to decay to the recommended 1000 dpm/100 cm2 limit. A spill of this size 
requires the contaminated surface at Disaster City to be allowed to decay two to three 
times longer than the planned surface contamination levels, depending on the 
radionuclide. 
Table 6. The time required for a 1 mCi spill over 100 cm2 to decay below  
1000 dpm/100 cm2. 
Radionuclide 
Time required to decay below 
1000 dpm/100 cm2 
(h) (d) 
F-18 38.6 1.61 
Na-24 316 13.7 
Mn-56 54.4 2.27 
Cu-64 268 11.2 
Br-82 744 31.0 
Tc-99m 127 5.28 
La-140 849 35.4 
 
III.E. Exercise Recommendations 
Dose estimates and results are known for the exercise performed by NNSS. For 
the actual exercise, the doses received were lower than the administrative limits, as well 
as the preliminary estimates used for justification of radiological safety. For the NNSS 
exercise using 20 mCi of 99mTc, the largest estimated dose was to the individual handling 
the source for one minute prior to dilution. An extremity dose of 400 mrem at 1 cm and a 
whole body dose of 0.5 mrem at 30 cm were estimated. In the actual exercise, the largest 
dose received was 20 mrem to the hand of the worker that dissolved the source. Because 
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the actual doses received in the NNSS exercise were lower than the estimated doses, 
following those calculation methods implies that estimates for the Disaster City exercise 
are also conservative. 
The results of this assessment are also conservative because the activities were 
not decay-corrected over the course of the exercise. If decay was accounted for, dose 
rates would decrease over time, which would in turn decrease exposure. In addition, no 
PPE was assumed for this assessment. Use of respiratory protection would restrict 
internal exposure even further and greatly diminish the TEDE and TODE for the worker, 
for which internal exposure contributes the most to the total dose. A negative pressure 
half-mask would decrease internal exposure by a factor of 10, and a full negative 
pressure facepiece would decrease internal exposure by a factor of 100 (U.S. NRC 
1992). All participants are at risk of being externally contaminated. For this reason, 
coveralls are recommended. From a training standpoint, there is value in testing the 
exercise participants’ ability to choose the proper PPE for the scenario, though 
ultimately the exercise controller should instruct the participants what to wear for safety 
during the exercise. 
The greatest uncertainties for this assessment are the amount of material inhaled 
and ingested by the worker during spraying, and the external exposure to the exercise 
participants from the contaminated surface. A 1% intake was assumed for the worker in 
order to follow the conservative assumptions used by NNSS. Actual evaporation of the 
source and the size of the aerosols resulting from spraying is not known. Further 
investigation of worker intake during spraying is recommended because this contributes 
 37 
 
most to worker exposure. It is also recommended that standard resuspension factors and 
breathing rates be applied to determine internal exposure to the exercise participant due 
to resuspension. The conservative 1 µCi intake assumption used by NNSS becomes 
unrealistic as the total activity used for the exercise approaches 1 µCi. 
The dose rate from the contaminated surface was modeled using an infinite plane 
source. For the infinite plane and slab geometries in the MicroShield program, only 
energy bins that are consistent with ANSI/ANS standard indices are allowed. User-
defined photon grouping is not allowed by the software. User-defined grouping and even 
the auto-grouping feature typically more realistically represent the photon-energy 
spectrum from a given radionuclide. Care was taken to verify that the source term using 
the ANSI/ANS standard indices adequately characterized the actual source spectrum. 
For all of the radionuclides used in the assessment, the contribution of each photon 
energy to the total source strength was balanced with the under- or overestimation of the 
photon energy itself, as prescribed by the standard indices. 
Actual distribution of the source onto an irregular surface such as one of the 
Disaster City rubble piles is not known and should be investigated further, as 
radioactivity could collect in certain areas of the pile and create larger dose rates. It 
could be valuable from a training standpoint to spray the source onto part of a rubble 
pile, which is not an even, flat surface. The sloped surfaces of the pile could contribute 
additional “shine” to participants.  
Potential modifications to the exercise could be applied to tailor the exercise to a 
specific scenario or desired radiation dose limit. For instance, a sealed source could be 
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added to the exercise to create an additional radiation field in which the exercise 
participants could operate. Additionally, the size of the contaminated area could be 
decreased, which would in turn concentrate the surface contamination level and create 
higher dose rates without increasing the total amount of activity used. The contamination 
could also purposely be distributed unevenly to simulate the dose rate contours that 
would be expected in a real incident. 
According to the assessment, the worker exposure limits the activity for the 
exercise. Exposure to the worker that dissolves and sprays the source could be reduced 
by using two people – one person to dissolve the source and one person to distribute the 
source. For the assessment it was assumed that one person performs both tasks because 
this is more conservative. Entirely eliminating the need for a worker to spray the source 
on the desired surface would vastly decrease total dose for this exercise. This could be 
done by using a robot or configuring a mechanical rig that pumps the source over the 
surface without a person present. However, these approaches have their own cons (e.g., 
mechanical failure) that would need to be analyzed if used. 
Radionuclide cost is also a point of consideration. The cost of activation at the 
NSC is $580 plus $100 for a transportation shield (Texas A&M Nuclear Science Center, 
personal correspondence, November 2015). The price for the compounds listed in Table 
1 ranges from $1 to $35 per 10 g of material. Limited information was obtained 
regarding the purchase of radiopharmaceuticals. A vendor in College Station currently 
provides 99mTc to the Texas A&M CVM for horse scans. The vendor is contracted to 
supply 99mTc for a $95 weekly charge in which CVM performs five to six scans 
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(NuTech, Inc., personal communication, February 2016). F-18 can be purchased from a 
vendor in Houston. A quote for a different project involving 18F at Texas A&M 
estimated $150 to $175 per dose ranging between 1 and 15 mCi, plus another $250 in 
delivery charges. A potential roadblock to using radiopharmaceuticals for the exercise at 
Disaster City is that radiopharmaceutical purchases are only authorized through a 
licensed nuclear pharmacy. The cyclotron at Texas A&M recently obtained licenses to 
produce isotopes for medical use, including 18F, but cost information is unknown at this 
time (Texas A&M EHSD, personal communication, February 2016). 
The logistics of an actual exercise could have a significant impact on the choice 
of radionuclide and needed activity. For example, it is possible that if the source is 
activated at the NSC, it will have to be transferred from the NSC radioactive material 
license to the Texas A&M EHSD radioactive material license. Regulatory contamination 
and radiation surveys would need to be performed and documented as part of this license 
transfer. In this scenario, it is recommended that the surveys and documentation be 
performed at Disaster City if possible in order to avoid transporting the source to EHSD 
prior to Disaster City, which could be an issue due to the short half-life. 
The International Commission on Radiological Protection proposes an increased 
cancer risk of 17 percent per Sv, or 0.17 percent per rem, based on effects seen at high 
doses (ICRP 2007). If the 50 mrem or 500 mrem administrative dose limits were reached 
as a result of this exercise, this equates to a 0.0085% and 0.085% increased cancer risk, 
respectively. In comparison, the lifetime risk of developing a cancer among the U.S. 
population is 42.05% for men and 37.58% for women (ACS 2016). The increased cancer 
 40 
 
risk from potential exposure during this exercise is very small compared to this 
background cancer incidence. The benefit of enhanced emergency response training 
using unsealed contamination outweighs the potential health detriments due to radiation 
exposure during the exercise. 
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CHAPTER IV  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The dose assessment methodology presented in this research can be used for any 
radionuclide and source activity so long as the radiological properties of the radionuclide 
are properly accounted for. The conservative results of the dose assessment indicate that 
an unsealed contamination exercise using the identified radionuclides (18F, 24Na, 56Mn, 
64Cu, 82Br, 99mTc, and 140La) at Disaster City is safe from a radiological standpoint, and 
that 99mTc results in the lowest dose. The choice of which radionuclide and what activity 
to use should be made based on budget and the logistics of the actual exercise, including 
exercise duration and desired dose rates.  
The results show that workers and exercise participants can receive measurable 
doses and as a result should be working under a worker permit and with proper badges 
and PPE. The most exposed individual for the hypothesized exercise is the worker that 
dissolves and distributes the source. The worker dose is manageable and can be limited 
by employing ALARA techniques. Only in the accident scenario where the entire source 
contents are ingested or inhaled are the assumed administrative dose limits exceeded. 
For an actual exercise, it is recommended that administrative dose limits be established 
for that specific exercise, taking into account the actual activity used and durations of 
exposures. 
The results of this research provide a basis for the decision to proceed with 
planning an unsealed radioactive contamination exercise at Disaster City. This exercise 
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will be a valuable addition to the few exercises currently performed worldwide using 
unsealed sources.  Publishing the process of radionuclide selection is also useful for the 
radiological/nuclear incident response community because limited information is 
publically available. 
 
IV.A. Future Work 
 Another graduate student at Texas A&M is currently performing a detailed 
characterization of background radiation and radioactivity levels at Disaster City such 
that if this exercise takes place, a contaminated area at Disaster City can be returned to 
known background levels. A next step towards executing this exercise at Disaster City 
would be to select and acquire a radionuclide, distribute it onto a surface and obtain 
exposure measurements to compare to the assessment.  
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APPENDIX A 
The radiological properties of the seven radionuclides identified for potential use at Disaster City are listed. 
 
Radionuclide F-18 Na-24 Mn-56 Cu-64 Br-82 Tc-99m La-140 
Decay 
method 
β+ to O-18 
(stable) 
 
Electron 
capture 
β- to Mg-24 
(stable) 
β- to Fe-56 
(stable) 
EC+β+ to Ni-64 
(61%),  
 
β- to Zn-64 
(39%) 
  
β- to Kr-82 
(stable) 
Primarily IT to  
Tc-99 
(211100 y  
half-life to  
Ru-99 stable) 
β- to Ce-140 
(stable) 
Half-life (h) 1.83 15.0 2.58 12.7 35.3 6.01 40.3 
Specific 
activity 
(Ci g-1) 
9.5x107 8.7x106 2.2x107 3.9x106 1.1x106 5.3x106 5.6x105 
Gamma-ray 
energies  
(keV) 
511 (193%) 
annihilation 
photons 
2754 (99.9%) 
1369 (99.9%) 
3866 (0.074%) 
847 (98.8%) 
1811 (26.9%) 
2113 (14.2%) 
511 (35.2%) 
annihilation 
photons 
 
1346 (0.475%) 
 
777 (83.4%) 
554 (71.1%) 
619 (43.5%) 
  
140 (89%) 1596 (95.4%) 
487 (45.5%) 
816 (23.3%) 
329 (20.3%) 
Beta 
endpoint 
energies 
(keV) 
633.5 
(96.7%) 
1391 (99.9%) 2848 (56.3%) 
1038 (27.9%) 
736 (14.6%) 
1673 (17.4%) 
578 (39%) 
444 (98.5%) 
265 (1.3%) 
-- 1365 (44%) 
1680 (19.2%) 
1244 (10.9%) 
2164 (4.8%) 
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APPENDIX B 
The thermal neutron capture cross sections for the naturally abundant isotopes of the 
elements that compose the compounds under consideration for neutron activation are 
listed. The target isotopes intended for activation are in bold font. 
Nuclide 
Natural  
Abundance (%) 
Thermal Neutron  
Capture Cross Section (b) 
H-1  99.96  0.3326 
H-2  0.01  0.0005 
C-12  98.93  0.0035 
C-13  1.07  0.0014 
O-16  99.76  0.0002 
O-17  0.04  0.0005 
O-18  0.20  0.0002 
Na-23  100.0  0.517 
Mg-24  78.99  0.054 
Mg-25  10.00  0.199 
Mg-26  11.01  0.038 
Mn-55  100.0  13.36 
S-32  94.99  0.518 
S-33  0.75  0.454 
S-34  4.25  0.256 
S-36  0.01  0.236 
Cu-63  69.2  4.5 
Cu-65  30.8  2.17 
Br-79  50.69  7.88 
Br-81  49.31  0.235 
La-138  0.09  57.2 
La-139  99.91  9.04 
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APPENDIX C 
The listed dose parameters were used for the dose assessment. 
 
Reference 
ORNL/ 
RSIC-
45/R1 10 CFR 20 FGR 11 10 CFR 20 FGR 11 
Nuclide 
Specific 
Gamma 
Constant  
(R m2  
h-1 Ci-1) f 
Ingestion  
ALI  
(µCi) 
Effective  
Ingestion 
DCF  
(Sv/Bq) 
Ingestion 
DCF for 
limiting 
organ  
(Sv/Bq) 
Limiting 
organ Class 
Inhalation  
ALI  
(µCi) 
Effective 
Inhalation 
DCF  
(Sv Bq-1) 
Inhalation  
DCF for 
limiting 
organ  
(Sv Bq-1) 
Limiting 
organ 
F-18 6.849E-01 1 5.00E+04 3.31E-11 2.87E-10 ST wall D 7.00E+04 2.26E-11 1.29E-10 Lung 
Na-24 1.928E+00 1 4.00E+03 3.84E-10 4.68E-10 B Surface D 5.00E+03 3.27E-10 1.25E-09 Lung 
Mn-56 9.169E-01 0.1 5.00E+03 2.64E-10 8.53E-11 Gonad D 2.00E+04 1.02E-10 4.40E-10 Lung 
Cu-64 1.300E-01 0.5 1.00E+04 1.26E-10 4.78E-11 Gonad W 2.00E+04 6.93E-11 3.35E-10 Lung 
Br-82 1.612E+00 1 3.00E+03 4.62E-10 4.48E-10 Gonad W 4.00E+03 4.13E-10 1.68E-09 Lung 
Tc-99m 1.227E-01 0.80 8.00E+04 1.68E-11 8.46E-11 Thyroid W 2.00E+05 7.21E-12 3.07E-11 Lung 
La-140 1.267E+00 0.001 6.00E+02 2.28E-09 1.34E-09 Gonad D 1.00E+03 9.33E-10 1.66E-09 Lung 
 
